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ABSTRACT 
When the Second Circuit decided McKithen v. Brown, it joined 
an ever-growing list of courts faced with a difficult and pressing 
issue of both constitutional and criminal law: is there a federal 
constitutional right of post-conviction access to evidence for DNA 
testing?  This issue, which sits at the intersection of new forensic 
technologies and fundamental principles of constitutional due 
process, has divided the courts.  The Second Circuit, wary of 
reaching a hasty conclusion, remanded McKithen’s case to the 
district court for consideration.  The district court for the Eastern 
District of New York was asked to decide whether a constitutional 
right of access to evidence for DNA testing exists both broadly as 
well as under the defendant’s circumstances.  This iBrief concludes 
that although a due process post-conviction right of access to 
evidence for DNA testing may exist under some circumstances, it 
does not exist under current constitutional jurisprudence in 
McKithen’s case. 
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 Any interpretation of the protections afforded by constitutional due 
process must evolve with the circumstances underlying modern criminal 
convictions.2  Scientific progress requires that constitutional values be 
reexamined in light of new technological developments, especially when 
science delivers technology that can conclusively exonerate the wrongly 
convicted.3  This iBrief addresses a question which has been described as 
                                                     
1 J.D. candidate, 2009, Duke University School of Law; B.S. in Biology, Duke 
University.  The author would like to thank Professor Erwin Chemerinsky for 
his invaluable assistance. 
2 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 415 (1819) (“[The] constitution 
[was] intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to 
the various crises of human affairs.”).
3 See Harvey v. Horan (Harvey II), 285 F.3d 298, 305 (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig, J., 
respecting the denial of rehearing en banc); The Innocence Project, About Us: 
Mission Statement, http://www.innocenceproject.org/about/Mission-
Statement.php (last visited Aug. 18, 2008). 
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“one of the most important criminal law issues of our day.”4  One judge 
grappling with this question framed it as follows: does “there exist[] under 
the Constitution of the United States a right, post-conviction, to access 
previously-produced forensic evidence for purposes of . . . DNA testing in 
order to establish—before the executive, if not also before the courts—
one’s complete innocence of the crime for which [one] has been convicted 
and sentenced.”5  Such a right, if it exists, would arise under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, which act to 
protect individuals’ liberty and to guard them against arbitrary and improper 
governmental action.6 
¶2 Post-conviction DNA testing has the capacity to provide reliable 
and concrete demonstrations of factual innocence.7  As of August 2008, 216 
individuals have been conclusively exonerated through post-conviction 
DNA testing in the United States.8  Sixteen of these individuals had served 
time on death row.9  Wrongful convictions, though not abundant, are by no 
means isolated or unusual events.10 
¶3 Current forensic DNA technology is categorically different from all 
other technologies preceding it.11  There is a consensus among the scientific 
community that DNA technology has the power to distinguish between any 
two individuals on the planet (saving, of course, identical twins).12  DNA 
testing is most commonly performed on samples from skin, blood, saliva, 
hair and semen.13  Established techniques of analysis can yield reliable 
                                                     
4 Harvey II, 285 F.3d at 304 (Luttig, J., respecting the denial of rehearing en 
banc). 
5 Id.  Others, in an attempt to disparage such a right, have defined it as a 
“general constitutional right for every inmate to continually challenge a valid 
conviction based on whatever technological advances may have occurred since 
his conviction became final.”  Harvey v. Horan (Harvey I), 278 F.3d 370, 375 
(4th Cir. 2002).  This, however, is not the appropriate level of inquiry.  See 
Harvey II, 285 F.3d at 310 (Luttig, J., respecting the denial of rehearing en 
banc). 
6 U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also McKithen v. 
Brown, 481 F.3d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 2007). 
7 NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, POSTCONVICTION DNA 
TESTING: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HANDLING REQUESTS vi (1999); The 
Innocence Project, About Us, http://www.innocenceproject.org/about/ (last 
visited Aug. 18, 2008). 
8 The Innocence Project, About Us: Mission Statement, supra note 3. 
9 Id. 
10 See The Innocence Project, About Us, supra note 7. 
11 Harvey II, 285 F.3d 298, 305 n.1 (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig, J., respecting the 
denial of rehearing en banc). 
12 Id. 
13 See NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 7, at xiii. 
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results from as little as a single cell.14  More commonly, between 50 and 
100 cells are needed to provide conclusive information.15  Though DNA 
technology in the U.S. is only used regularly in rape and homicide cases, 
where it has the most probative value, it can also be used to make 
identifications based on cells left behind on items touched by a 
perpetrator.16  Due to the statistical improbability of a DNA match between 
any two individuals, in certain cases, an adequately powered testing 
procedure is capable of conclusively exonerating an individual to a practical 
certainty.17 
¶4 Advances in forensic DNA technology have not gone unnoticed by 
both federal and state legislatures.  In 2004, Congress passed the Innocence 
Protection Act (IPA), which is contained in the Justice for All Act of 
2004.18  The Act provides for post-conviction DNA testing in certain 
federal cases, requires the preservation of biological evidence, and allocates 
funds to help states finance the testing.19  A majority of states have taken 
similar measures.  Forty-three states have enacted statutes providing for 
some level of post-conviction DNA testing.20  However, because not all 
states have acted to provide post-conviction access to testing, and because 
testing under both federal and state law is only reserved for statutorily-
defined categories of cases, prisoners continue to seek post-conviction 
access to DNA testing as a federal constitutional matter.21 
                                                     
14 See I. Findlay et al., DNA Fingerprinting from Single Cells, 389 NATURE 555, 
555 (1997). 
15 See NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 7, at xv. 
16 Id. at 1; Roland van Oorschor & Maxwell Jones, DNA Fingerprints from 
Fingerprints, 387 NATURE 767, 767 (1997). 
17 Harvey II, 285 F.3d 298, 305 n.1 (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig, J., respecting the 
denial of rehearing en banc). 
18 Justice For All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, 118 Stat. 2260 (codified in 
scattered sections of 18, 28 and 42 U.S.C.); Matthew J. Mueller, Handling 
Claims of Actual Innocence: Rejecting Federal Habeas Corpus as the Best 
Avenue for Addressing Claims of Innocence Based on DNA Evidence, 56 CATH. 
U. L. REV. 227, 254–55 (2006).  The Innocence Protection Act can be found at 
Title IV of the Justice for All Act. 
19 Mueller, supra note 18, at 255. 
20 The Innocence Project, News and Information: Fact Sheets, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/304.php (last visited Aug. 18, 2008). 
21 See, e.g, McKithen v. Brown, 481 F.3d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting that 
petitioner, McKithen, had sought and was denied access to DNA testing through 
state avenues).  For example, New York’s post-conviction DNA testing statute 
provides that “[w]here the defendant's motion requests the performance of a 
forensic DNA test on specified evidence, and upon the court's determination that 
any evidence containing deoxyribonucleic acid (“DNA”) was secured in 
connection with the trial resulting in the judgment, the court shall grant the 
application for forensic DNA testing of such evidence upon its determination 
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¶5 In March of 2007, the Second Circuit found itself “at this 
intersection of scientific advance and enduring constitutional values.”22  In 
McKithen v. Brown,23 the Second Circuit was invited to determine whether 
the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee 
a right to post-conviction DNA testing.24  The Second Circuit temporarily 
declined to answer the question, remanding the case to the district court for 
its consideration.  This iBrief considers the question with which the district 
court was charged and concludes that even if one accepts all of the 
arguments posited for the existence of such a constitutional right, McKithen 
is nevertheless precluded from relief under a theory of a due process right of 
post-conviction DNA testing. 
I. MCKITHEN V. BROWN 
¶6 In 1993, McKithen was convicted of attempted murder and related 
charges.25  The prosecution’s theory was that McKithen appeared at the 
apartment he once shared with his estranged wife, ran to the kitchen and 
grabbed a knife, stabbed his wife in the lower back as she was fleeing out of 
a window, and fled the apartment.26  A distinctive knife, which McKithen’s 
wife identified as the weapon used on her, was admitted into evidence at 
                                                                                                                       
that if a DNA test had been conducted on such evidence, and if the results had 
been admitted in the trial resulting in the judgment, there exists a reasonable 
probability that the verdict would have been more favorable to the defendant.”  
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW. § 440.30(1-a)(a) (McKinney 2004).  As was the 
situation  in McKithen’s case, the court made a determination that “there is no 
reasonable probability that the results of such testing would have resulted in a 
verdict more favorable to [McKithen].”  McKithen, 481 F.3d at 94.  McKithen 
disagreed and asserted a right to DNA testing under separate, constitutional, 
grounds.  See id.
22 McKithen, 481 F.3d at 92.  For a list of selected appellate courts to have 
considered this issue, see infra note 24. 
23 McKithen v. Brown, 481 F.3d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 
1218 (2008), remanded to, NO. 02-CV-1670 JG LB, 2008 WL 2791852   
(E.D.N.Y. Jul. 21, 2008).
24 Id.  Other courts have addressed this issue, but have failed to achieve 
consensus.  Compare Harvey II, 285 F.3d 298, 312–15 (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig, 
J., respecting the denial of rehearing en banc) (“I believe, and would hold, that 
there does exist such a post-conviction right of access to evidence.”), with 
Harvey I, 278 F.3d 370, 388 (4th Cir. 2002) (King, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) (concluding that the defendant had “no post-
conviction legal right to access or discover the [biological] evidence relating to 
his . . . conviction”).  The Eleventh Circuit declined to weigh in on “the thorny 
threshold issue.” Grayson v. King, 460 F.3d 1328, 1340–41 (11th Cir. 2006).
25 McKithen, 481 F.3d at 93. 
26 Id. at 93–94. 
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trial, yet this knife was never subjected to DNA or fingerprint testing.27  
Seven years after his conviction, McKithen moved to compel DNA testing 
of the weapon.28  In 2002, while still incarcerated, he brought suit under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983,29 which provides a cause of action for persons deprived “of 
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.”30  He 
claimed that the district attorney had “violated his constitutional right of 
post-conviction access to evidence for DNA testing” by denying him access 
to the knife he sought to have tested.31  The district court referred the case 
to a magistrate judge who noted that courts have disagreed as to the 
existence of any substantive or procedural right to post-conviction DNA 
testing.32  The magistrate judge ultimately concluded that McKithen’s suit 
could be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and therefore 
declined to reach the underlying constitutional issue.33  The district court 
adopted the recommendation of the magistrate judge, and McKithen 
subsequently appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.34 
¶7 The Second Circuit was ultimately faced with the constitutional 
question at hand.  After analyzing applicable Supreme Court precedent and 
decisions in other circuits, the Second Circuit concluded that the claim 
should not have been dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.35  
The Second Circuit then agreed with the Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh 
Circuits, and district courts in the First and Third Circuits that a claim 
seeking post-conviction access to evidence for DNA testing may properly 
be brought as a § 1983 suit.36  The Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits had 
previously reached the opposite conclusion.37  The Second Circuit then 
found that McKithen’s claim was not estopped by either claim or issue 
                                                     
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
30 McKithen, 481 F.3d at 99. 
31 Id. at 94. 
32 Id. at 94–95 (quoting the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation); see 
also supra note 24. 
33 McKithen, 481 F.3d at 95. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 99. 
36 Id. For other cases holding that a claim for post-conviction access to evidence 
for DNA testing may be brought as a § 1983 suit, see Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 
667, 669 (7th Cir. 2006), Osborne v. Dist. Attorney's Office, 423 F.3d 1050, 
1054 (9th Cir. 2005), Bradley v. Pryor, 305 F.3d 1287, 1290-91 (11th Cir. 
2002), and Wade v. Brady, 460 F.Supp.2d 226, 237 (D. Mass. 2006).
37 McKithen, 481 F.3d at 100–01.  For cases holding that such a claim is may not 
be brought as a § 1983 suit, see Boyle v. Mayer, 46 Fed. Appx. 340, 340 (6th 
Cir. 2002) (unpublished decision), Kutzner v. Montgomery County, 303 F.3d 
339, 340–41 (5th Cir. 2002) (per curiam), and Harvey I, 278 F.3d 370, 375 (4th 
Cir. 2002). 
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preclusion.38  Therefore, the court was required to determine first, whether a 
federal constitutional right to post-conviction DNA testing exists and 
second, what its contours are.39  Because of the “fact-intensive nature of the 
inquiry” and “in light of the need to approach the issue cautiously,” the 
Second Circuit remanded the case to the district court.40 
¶8 However, the Second Circuit did not leave the district court to 
blindly struggle with this “extraordinarily important, and delicate, 
constitutional issue.”41  It provided guidance in its opinion for how to 
proceed.  First, the district court must consider whether the liberty interest 
remaining after conviction already recognized in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence “encompasses an interest in accessing or possessing 
potentially exonerative biological evidence.”42  Then, the Second Circuit 
explained that if the district court concludes that this specific post-
conviction liberty interest exists, procedural due process applies to its 
deprivation in the instant case.43  The proper inquiry for analyzing 
procedural due process claims begins with the framework set out by the 
Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge.44  Using the Mathews factors, the 
district court should determine whether McKithen’s procedural due process 
rights were violated in this instance.45  Furthermore, the Second Circuit 
noted that a constitutional right of access may derive directly from 
substantive due process.46  Because the Due Process Clause has been 
construed as granting substantive rights as well as the right that appropriate 
procedures be used in cases of deprivation of life, liberty, or property, the 
district court must also evaluate the existence of a constitutional right of 
access from a substantive due process framework.47 
                                                     
38 McKithen, 481 F.3d at 104–06. 
39 Id. at 106–07. 
40 Id. at 106. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 106–07. 
43 Id. at 107. 
44 Id; see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
45 McKithen, 481 F.3d at 107. 
46 Id. at 107 n.17. 
47 Id.  Judge Luttig of the Fourth Circuit has suggested that “there might well be 
a straightforward substantive due process right to [access to post-conviction 
DNA testing].”  Harvey II, 285 F.3d 298, 318 (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig, J., 
respecting the denial of rehearing en banc.).  Several district courts have 
embraced former Judge Luttig’s view.  See, e.g., Wade v. Brady, 460 F.Supp.2d 
226, 249 (D. Mass. 2006) (finding that “the Due Process Clause provides a 
substantive right to post-conviction DNA testing in cases where testing could 
raise serious doubts about the original verdict”). 
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II. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AND POST-CONVICTION ACCESS TO 
DNA EVIDENCE 
¶9 Prisoners have two paths available to them in order to remedy 
violations of their federal constitutional rights.48  First, a prisoner may elect 
to file a habeas petition under .28 U.S.C. § 2254 49  To qualify for habeas 
relief, a prisoner must file a petition in district court alleging that “he is in 
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws . . . of the United States.”50  
A prisoner may alternatively seek relief by filing a suit under 
,
42 U.S.C. § 
1983 51 which provides a civil cause of action for persons who have been 
“depriv[ed] of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws.”52 
¶10 Under each of these statutes, the petitioner must allege a violation 
of a constitutional right.53  Therefore, a prisoner who can successfully assert 
a constitutional right of post-conviction access to DNA evidence would be 
afforded the opportunity for relief through either of these two avenues, 
provided that all other procedural requirements are met.  However, the law 
is unsettled as to whether such a right exists and if so, as to the extent of its 
reach. 
¶11 The Supreme Court has never explicitly recognized the existence of 
a procedural due process right of access to post-conviction DNA testing.54 
It is difficult to categorize a right of post-conviction access to DNA 
evidence as a constitutional one because the concept does not fit cleanly 
into any preexisting categories of recognized procedural or substantive due 
process rights.55  Yet, despite these hurdles, procedural due process grounds 
for a post-conviction right of access to DNA evidence for retesting may 
exist.  The following arguments have been made to support a procedural 
due process right of post-conviction access to DNA evidence. 
A. Claims of actual innocence 
¶12 A post-conviction right of access to DNA evidence is difficult to 
categorize as “a right of ‘factual innocence.’”56  The Supreme Court has 
declared that though claims of actual innocence are not constitutional 
                                                     
48 Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 480 (1994). 
49 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006). 
50 Id. 
51 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
52 Id. 
53 See Heck, 512 U.S. at 480. 
54 See Harvey II, 285 F.3d 298, 311 (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig, J., respecting the 
denial of rehearing en banc). 
55 Id. 
56 See id. at 310. 
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themselves, they do operate as an entry for habeas petitioners seeking to 
challenge state custody over their person.57  In Herrera v. Collins,58 the 
Supreme Court reiterated that claims of actual innocence are not themselves 
constitutional; they are merely a “gateway through which a habeas 
petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim 
considered on the merits.”59  The Supreme Court reaffirmed this holding in 
the 2006 case of House v. Bell,60 where the court explicitly refrained from 
resolving the controversy as to whether freestanding innocence claims are 
actual constitutional claims.61 
¶13 The Supreme Court has remarked that a petitioner may, in rare 
circumstances, have his federal constitutional claim considered on the 
merits, through the writ of habeas corpus, if he produces a sufficient 
showing of actual innocence.62  This rule is referred to as the “fundamental 
miscarriage of justice” exception and is available “only where the prisoner 
supplements his constitutional claim with a colorable showing of factual 
innocence.”63  The Supreme Court has not yet defined what showing would 
be necessary to support a claim of actual innocence, yet it has noted that the 
“threshold showing” for such a claim “would necessarily be extraordinarily 
high.”64  Concurring in the judgment in Herrera, Justice White posited that 
“to be entitled to relief” a petitioner claiming actual innocence “would at the 
very least be required to show that based on proffered newly discovered 
evidence and the entire record before the jury that convicted him, ‘no 
rational trier or fact could [find] proof of guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt.’”65  
¶14 An individual claiming actual innocence and seeking access to 
DNA evidence does not have a constitutional claim: “[t]he existence merely 
of newly discovered evidence relevant to the guilt of a state prisoner is not a 
                                                     
57 Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404 (1993).  The position that claims of 
actual innocence are not constitutional in themselves is the position taken by the 
majority in Herrera.  See id.  However, one can deduce from the four other 
opinions written in this case that five of the justices may have been willing to 
find that claims of actual innocence are themselves constitutional.  See id. at 427 
(O’Connor & Kennedy, JJ., concurring); id. at 430 (Blackmun, Stevens, & 
Souter, JJ., dissenting).
58 Herrera, 506 U.S. 390. 
59 Id. at 404. 
60 House v. Bell, 126 S. Ct. 2064 (2006). 
61 Id. at 2086–87. 
62 Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404. 
63 Id. (quoting Kulhmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454) (emphasis added by the 
Court in Herrera).
64 Id. at 417. 
65 Id. at 429 (White, J. concurring) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 
324 (1979)).
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ground for relief on federal habeas corpus.”66  However, it has been 
proposed that the writ of habeas corpus is deprived of its effectiveness if a 
petitioner lacks the means to make a claim of actual innocence.67  A 
prisoner who needs access to DNA evidence in order to make a 
constitutionally sufficient showing of actual innocence would lose the 
benefit of habeas corpus protection if he could not access such evidence.  
Therefore, a right of access to DNA evidence may be procedure that is 
necessary for a petitioner to establish a well-supported claim of actual 
innocence, which he must do to litigate the constitutionality of his detention 
through habeas.68  Such a right grounded in actual innocence would 
consequently only exist if the State deprived an individual of the means 
necessary to make a sufficient showing of actual innocence. 
B. An extension of Brady access to exculpatory evidence 
¶15 The Supreme Court first recognized a defendant’s right of access to 
material, exculpatory evidence held by the prosecution in order to ensure a 
fair trial in Brady v. Maryland.69  This requirement was deemed necessary 
as a matter of procedural due process, or more simply, is required by basic 
fairness.70  This constitutional right explicitly concerns only pre-trial 
production by the prosecution of all evidence favorable to the accused, not 
post-conviction access to evidence.71  Moreover, the holding in Brady only 
reaches evidence whose meaning is known to the prosecutor and can be 
directly evaluated, not untested evidence whose significance is unknown.72 
¶16 The Supreme Court, in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie,73 extended the 
reach of Brady by holding that that due process required the prosecution, at 
trial, to produce certain evidence whose import was unknown so that it 
could be reviewed by the court to properly determine its evidentiary 
                                                     
66 Id. at 398 (majority opinion) (quoting Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 
(1963)).
67 See, e.g., Cherrix v. Braxton, 131 F. Supp. 2d 756, 760 (E.D. Va. 2001) 
(holding that discovery of the DNA evidence in question “is reasonably 
necessary [to support] the habeas petitioner’s claims of actual innocence.”); 
Benjamin Vetter, Habeas, Section 1983 and Post-Conviction Access to DNA 
Evidence, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 587, 590–91. 
68 See Cherrix, 131 F. Supp. 2d at 760. 
69 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
70 Harvey II, 285 F.3d 298, 316 (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig, J., respecting the denial 
of rehearing en banc). 
71 See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. 
72 Seth F. Kreimer & David Rudovsky, Double Helix, Double Bind: Factual 
Innocence and Postconviction DNA Testing, 151 U. PENN. L. REV. 547, 583 
(2002). 
73 Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987). 
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value.74  The reach of Brady has also been extended by lower courts to 
various contexts not specifically addressed by the Supreme Court’s initial 
holding.75  For example, the Ninth Circuit has held that under Brady, the 
state was required to produce any exculpatory semen evidence in its 
possession during a post-conviction habeas proceeding.76 Arguments have 
been made for a further extension of the holding in Brady to encompass 
post-conviction access to DNA evidence.77  Such an extension would derive 
from the idea that “the very same principle of elemental fairness that 
dictates pre-trial production of all potentially exculpatory evidence dictates 
post-trial production of this infinitely narrower category of evidence.”78  
Similarly, it has been observed that despite the fact that the Court has not 
specifically addressed the existence of a post-conviction Brady right, the 
existing cases support the notion that core due process interests, including 
the interests underlying the holding in Brady, do indeed survive 
conviction.79 
¶17 However, the Supreme Court has further explained that evidence is 
material for Brady purposes “only if there is a reasonable probability that, 
had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different.  A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”80  Therefore, a right of 
post-conviction access to DNA evidence based on Brady access to evidence 
could only exist in circumstances where the DNA evidence sought would 
have a reasonable probability of undermining confidence in the outcome of 
the case.81 
C. Access to the courts 
¶18 A post-conviction right of access to DNA evidence could also be 
construed in terms of a due process right of meaningful access to the courts.  
The Constitution guarantees the fundamental right of meaningful access to 
the courts.82  A post-conviction right of access to evidence may derive 
                                                     
74 Id. at 58–59. 
75 Wade v. Brady, 460 F. Supp. 2d 226, 243 (D. Mass. 2006). 
76 Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979 F.2d 746, 749–50 (9th Cir. 2002). 
77 See, e.g., Harvey II, 285 F.3d 298, 316 (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig, J., respecting 
the denial of rehearing en banc); Kreimer & Rudovsky, supra note 73 at 583–87. 
78 Harvey II, 285 F.3d at 317 (Luttig, J., respecting the denial of rehearing en 
banc). 
79 Wade, 460 F. Supp. 2d. at 248 (providing an extensive discussion of this 
argument). 
80 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). 
81 For an illustration of a court implementing this analysis, see Arthur v. King, 
No. 3:07-cv-319-WKW, slip op. at 6–7 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 17, 2007). 
82 Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977). 
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directly from the fundamental right of access to the courts, because when an 
individual is denied access to evidence needed to challenge his conviction, 
he is ultimately barred from access to the courts on the merits of his case.83  
Such a substantial burden on access to the courts can be seen as constituting 
a violation of constitutional due process.84  However, Supreme Court 
precedent exposes a flaw in this argument.  Currently, one must present an 
underlying claim on which a right of access to the courts has been denied; 
one must allege actual injury.85  The right of access to courts doctrine is 
secondary in nature to an underlying claim.86  Therefore, a right to post-
conviction access of DNA evidence would already need to exist for one to 
assert its deprivation as an actual injury, and consequently, denial of access 
to the courts. 
D. Protection of a prisoner’s residual post-conviction liberty interest 
¶19 A constitutional right to post-conviction DNA access may derive 
from a prisoner’s residual liberty interest, an interest defined as the liberty 
interest that remains after conviction.  Post-conviction access to DNA 
evidence may be the procedure required to adequately protect this liberty 
interest.  As the Second Circuit noted in McKithen, the Supreme Court has 
“made clear that prisoners lawfully deprived of their freedom retain 
substantive liberty interests under the Fourteenth Amendment.”87  Though 
the exact contours of this residual liberty interest are unclear, it is probable 
that under current Supreme Court precedent, some portion of a prisoner’s 
liberty interest both in pursuing his freedom and in being free from 
confinement persist after conviction.88 
¶20 Post-conviction access to DNA evidence would arguably be needed 
to adequately protect this interest.  Even if further resort to the judicial 
process is, under law, not available because of procedural hurdles, an 
individual may still pursue his freedom through clemency.  The Supreme 
Court has indeed remarked that “[c]lemency is deeply rooted in our Anglo-
American tradition of law, and is the historic remedy for preventing 
miscarriages of justice where judicial process has been exhausted.”89  
                                                     
83 Kreimer & Rudovsky, supra note 72, at 565–76. 
84 Id. at 570. 
85 Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996). 
86 Arthur, slip op. at 9. 
87 McKithen v. Brown, 481 F.3d 89, 106 (2d Cir. 2007).  See Youngberg v. 
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315 (1982) (“The mere fact that [an individual] has been 
committed under proper procedures does not deprive him of all substantive 
liberty interests under the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
88 See Harvey II, 285 F.3d 298, 314 (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig, J., respecting the 
denial of rehearing en banc). 
89 Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 411–12 (1993). 
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However, in order to pursue freedom from confinement through clemency, 
one must access the evidence needed to present to the executive in order to 
seek clemency.  Therefore, procedural due process would require post-
conviction access to DNA evidence in order to adequately protect one’s 
residual liberty interest in being free from confinement and pursuing one’s 
freedom, if not from the judiciary, then from the executive.90 
¶21 Yet, even supporters of a constitutional right of post-conviction 
access concede that such a right should only exist in “certain, very limited 
circumstances.”91  Proponents of such a right have argued for its existence 
under circumstances where DNA testing of evidence would be probative of 
the individual’s innocence.92  Only then would a prisoner’s interests 
arguably outweigh any legitimate interests the government may have in 
withholding such evidence.  For example, in arguing for a procedural due 
process protection of post-conviction access to DNA evidence, former 
Judge Luttig of the Fourth Circuit stated he would define such a right as “a 
right of access to evidence for tests which, given the particular crime for 
which the individual was convicted and the evidence that was offered by the 
government at trial in support of the defendant’s guilt, could prove beyond 
any doubt that the individual in fact did not commit the crime.”93  Judge 
Gertner, judge for the District Court for the State of Massachusetts, was 
more liberal in his definition of this right, but still limited the right to 
special circumstances, concluding that the “Due Process Clause provides a 
substantive right to post-conviction DNA testing in cases where testing 
could raise serious doubts about the original verdict.”94 
E. McKithen’s procedural due process claim 
¶22 The Second Circuit remanded McKithen’s case  to the district court 
so that it could consider whether a post-conviction right of access to DNA 
testing exists under McKithen’s circumstances and if so, whether it has been 
violated.  This iBrief contends that even if one accepts every argument 
advanced for a procedural due process right of post-conviction access to 
                                                     
90 Harvey II, 285 F.3d at 314 (Luttig, J., respecting the denial of rehearing en 
banc). 
91 See, e.g., id. at 318. 
92 Id.; Kreimer & Rudovsky, supra note 72, at 570; see also, e.g., Arthur v. 
King, No. 2:07-cv-319-WKW, slip op. at 8 (M D. Ala. Aug. 17, 2007) 
(declining to find a violation of procedural due process where DNA evidence 
would not have enough probative weight exculpate the individual seeking 
access). 
93 Harvey II, 285 F.3d at 315 (Luttig, J., respecting the denial of rehearing en 
banc).  No other circuits have attempted to define such a right. 
94 Wade v. Brady, 460 F.Supp.2d 226, 249 (D. Mass. 2006).
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DNA evidence, this right does not exist, nor has it been infringed in 
McKithen’s case. 
¶23 In McKithen’s case, it is logically impossible that any DNA 
evidence produced could be conclusively exculpatory.  In fact it has little, if 
no, probative value.  At trial, the knife used against McKithen’s estranged 
wife was never fingerprinted, nor was it subjected to DNA testing.95  
However, since DNA remains stable over time, it still may be possible to 
locate DNA on the knife and subject such DNA to testing.96  The 
prosecution argued at trial that McKithen appeared at the home of his 
estranged wife, grabbed a knife from the kitchen, stabbed her as she was 
fleeing, and fled the apartment.97  Therefore, at least two types of DNA 
could possibly be found on the knife—DNA from the victim and DNA from 
cells left on fingerprints by the attacker. 
¶24 No result that is obtainable from a DNA test could logically 
exculpate McKithen from his crime.  First, the presence of McKithen’s 
DNA on the knife will logically inculpate him.  Second, a lack of 
McKithen’s DNA on the knife is also perfectly consistent with the 
prosecution’s theory of the case.  This is not a case in which the evidence in 
question consists of blood traces left by an assailant, or semen, both of 
which, if found, can be tested and potentially used conclusively to tie an 
individual to a crime.98  Here, the prosecution argued that the assailant only 
touched the knife.  One does not necessarily leave enough DNA for testing 
wherever one touches.99  McKithen could have grabbed the knife and used 
it on his estranged wife without leaving a sufficient amount of his own 
DNA behind.  Although DNA can be recovered and successfully tested a 
substantial amount of time after it was deposited, it also is possible that any 
DNA evidence that could have originally been present on the knife may not 
have survived in a condition suitable for testing.100  Thus, there are a 
number of reasons why it is possible that DNA testing may not reveal a 
DNA match for McKithen.  Third, if the DNA of another, unidentified 
individual is found on the knife, there are non-exculpatory explanations for 
this: someone other than the wife had previously visited the apartment and 
used the knife.  In addition, a rogue skin cell or two could have 
contaminated the knife during the time it has been held in evidence.101  In 
                                                     
95 McKithen, 481 F.3d at 94. 
96 NAT’L INST. FOR JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 21. 
97 McKithen, 481 F.3d at 93–94. 
98 See NAT’L INST. FOR JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 21–22. 
99  Rebecca Kanable, DNA from Fingerprints?, L. ENFORCEMENT TECH., July 
2005, at 66, available at http://www.officer.com/print/Law-Enforcement-
Technology/DNA-from-Fingerprints/1$25197. 
100 Id. 
101 See Van Oorschor & Jones, supra note 16, at 768. 
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sum, there is no way that any finding made based on the DNA on the knife 
could conclusively exculpate McKithen. 
¶25 Based on the nature of any potential DNA evidence in McKithen’s 
case, McKithen is incapable of asserting a constitutional right to post-
conviction access to DNA evidence under the actual innocence argument, 
the Brady argument, or the access to the courts argument.  All three of these 
theories require that the DNA evidence requested have the potential to 
actually be probatively exculpatory.102  Since any DNA evidence produced 
from the knife would not have any exculpatory value, a right of access to 
the knife for testing does not exist in McKithen’s case. 
¶26 Under the fourth theory posited, a post-conviction right of access to 
DNA could derive from a prisoner’s residual liberty interest.103  Assuming, 
arguendo, that the district court concludes a liberty interest which should be 
protected through a post-conviction right of access to DNA evidence does 
exist in McKithen’s case, this iBrief argues that he has already received 
adequate procedure to protect this interest and therefore, such a right has not 
been infringed. 
¶27 If such a post-conviction liberty interest is constitutionally 
cognizable in McKithen’s case, procedural due process applies to its 
deprivation.104  The Second Circuit instructed the district court to use the 
framework established by the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge105 for 
analyzing procedural due process claims.  Mathews applies where an 
individual has a liberty or property interest that the government seeks to 
eliminate.106  The test set forth in Mathews is used to determine the 
administrative and judicial procedures constitutionally required.107 
¶28 The Second Circuit notes that the Mathews test is the appropriate 
one to use given that McKithen is seeking post-conviction access to 
evidence.108  The court remarks that a higher standard would apply if 
McKithen were bringing a challenge to his underlying conviction or to “the 
process afforded during criminal proceedings themselves.”109  However, 
here, McKithen is not directly bringing a challenge to his conviction 
because evidence of innocence provided by tests performed on the 
theoretically exculpatory DNA evidence he seeks would be a prerequisite 
                                                     
102 See supra Part II.A–C. 
103 See supra Part II.D. 
104 McKithen v. Brown, 481 F.3d 89, 107 (2d Cir. 2007). 
105 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
106 Grayson v. King, 460 F.3d 1328, 1340 (11th Cir. 2006). 
107 Id. 
108 McKithen, 481 F.3d at 107. 
109 Id. (quoting Krimstock v. Kelly, 464 F.3d 246, 254 (2d Cir. 2006)).
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for a direct challenge.  In addition, he is not challenging the rules of 
criminal procedure used to determine his guilt or innocence.110 
¶29 The Mathews framework is the following: 
[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally 
requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private 
interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of 
an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, 
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 
safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the 
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the 
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.111
¶30 Due process “is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as 
the particular situation demands”112 and “is not a technical conception with 
a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstance.”113  Recognizing 
the non-rigid nature of due process, the Second Circuit advises that “[u]nder 
Mathews the cases inevitably turn on their particular facts – which in the 
instant case include the availability or statutory avenues of relief, such as 
state or federal legislation providing for DNA testing, and the seriousness of 
the crime and sentence involved.”114  The court also draws attention to the 
potential cost to the state as a factor to be considered.115 
1. The private interest that will be affected by the official action 
¶31 McKithen’s alleged private interest in obtaining access to the 
evidence at issue is arguably a substantial one.  Such an interest would 
probably be classified as a liberty interest remaining after conviction (a 
“residual liberty interest”) in freedom from restraint and to pursue freedom 
from confinement.116  As noted, there is much debate as to whether such an 
interest is constitutionally cognizable.117  It is sufficient for the purposes of 
this analysis to assume that some such interest exists and that it holds some 
constitutional weight. 
                                                     
110 See id. 
111 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. 
112 McKithen, 481 F.3d at 107–08 (quoting Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal 
& Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 12 (1979)). 
113 Id. at 108 (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334). 
114 Id. at 107–08. 
115 Id. at 108. 
116 Harvey II, 285 F.3d 298, 313 (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig, J., respecting the denial 
of rehearing en banc). 
117 See Grayson v. King, 460 F.3d 1328, 1340–41 (11th Cir. 2006) (noting the 
disagreement on whether or not a liberty interest under the due process clause 
residually survives final conviction and sentencing). 
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2. The risk of an erroneous deprivation and other procedural safeguards 
¶32 The risk of an erroneous deprivation of whatever continued liberty 
interest McKithen has is low.  In addition, McKithen has received the 
benefit of other procedural safeguards.118  Therefore, this factor weighs 
against McKithen.  First, McKithen was found guilty by a jury at a fair trial 
in which no prosecutorial misconduct was alleged.119  He received an 
appeal in which his conviction was affirmed; it was determined that his 
conviction was not against the weight of the evidence.120  Seven years after 
his conviction, McKithen moved to compel DNA testing of the knife 
admitted into evidence in accordance with a New York provision providing 
for post-conviction DNA testing under certain circumstances.121  The New 
York provision required that testing shall only be granted upon a 
determination that “if a DNA test had been conducted on such evidence, 
and if the results had been admitted in the trial resulting in the judgment, 
there exists a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been more 
favorable to the defendant.”122  The Queens County Court denied his 
motion, concluding that “there is no reasonable probability that the results 
of such testing would have resulted in a verdict more favorable to 
[McKithen].”123 
¶33 The Second Circuit notes that the Mathews analysis depends in part 
on “adequate statutory avenues for relief.”124  The New York legislature, 
cognizant of the reality of wrongful convictions, enacted a statute providing 
for post-conviction testing of potentially exculpatory DNA testing.125  In 
fact, New York was the first such state to so do.126  The New York 
legislature has provided an opportunity for prisoners for whom DNA 
evidence has the potential to exculpate to be granted access to this 
evidence.127  Here, it was determined that there is no “reasonable 
                                                     
118 See McKithen, 481 F.3d at 94. McKithen received an appeal, on which his 
conviction was affirmed.  Id.  He also received the opportunity to request access 
to DNA evidence under the relevant New York statute, of which he availed 
himself.  Id. 
119 Id. 
120 People v. McKithen, 634 N.Y.S.2d 128, 129 (1995). 
121 McKithen, 481 F.3d at 94. 
122 Id. (citing N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.30(1-a)(a) (McKinney 2004)). 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.30(1-a)(a) (McKinney 2004). 
126 The Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/395.php 
(last visited Aug. 18, 2008). 
127 The New York statute requires that the court grant access to forensic DNA 
testing “if a DNA test had been conducted on such evidence [at trial], and if the 
results had been admitted in the trial resulting in the judgment, there exists a 
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probability that the verdict would have been more favorable to [McKithen]” 
even if any results of the DNA testing had originally been admitted at 
trial.128  The court arguably made such a determination about the probative 
value of any DNA evidence for the same reasons articulated above as to 
why any DNA evidence could not be conclusively exculpatory.  Here, 
McKithen received, by way of the New York post-conviction DNA testing 
statute, an additional procedural safeguard under which he could have 
obtained access to the evidence if it could have helped him to overturn his 
verdict.  Consequently, any risk of an erroneous deprivation of McKithen’s 
liberty interest in seeking freedom from confinement is low.  If any DNA 
evidence produced would have assisted him in his endeavor, he would have 
been granted access to the DNA evidence under this statute.129 
3. The Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal 
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 
requirement would entail
¶34 The third factor of the Mathews analysis favors the denial of access 
to DNA evidence in McKithen’s case, although it appears that such a 
conclusion is best supported only when any DNA evidence produced would 
lack the potential to exculpate the prisoner.  The government has a 
compelling interest in the finality of duly adjudicated criminal judgments.130  
The government also has strong interests in “guarding against a flood of 
requests . . . and ensuring closure for victims and survivors.”131 
¶35 In McKithen’s case, the government will bear no fiscal burden in 
permitting access to evidence for DNA testing since McKithen volunteered 
to cover the costs of testing himself.132  McKithen does not challenge the 
state’s procedures for the collection and storage of biological evidence.133  
Such a challenge would naturally trigger a valid concern as to cost.134  Here, 
McKithen simply seeks access to evidence already available.135  In addition, 
                                                                                                                       
reasonable probability that the verdict would have been more favorable to the 
defendant.”  N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.30(1-a)(a) (McKinney 2004). 
128 McKithen, 481 F.3d at 94. 
129 See supra text accompanying note 127. 
130 Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 555 (1998). 
131 Grayson v. King, 460 F.3d 1328, 1342 (11th Cir. 2006). 
132 McKithen, 481 F.3d at 108.  DNA testing can cost as much as $5,000.  
Gwendolyn Carroll, Comment, Proven Guilty: An Examination of the Penalty-
Free World of Post-Conviction DNA Testing, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
665, 666 (2007).  Almost every state that provides for post-conviction testing 
funds the testing for indigent petitioners and requires solvent petitioners to 
advance the funding for the test.  Id. at 669. 
133 McKithen, 481 F.3d at 109. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
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the government has likely incurred a greater cost in opposing McKithen’s 
request for access to DNA evidence than it would if the request had been 
granted. 
¶36 If the results of the DNA test were to confirm McKithen’s guilt, 
then the state’s interest in the finality of judgments would no doubt be 
served.  If the results prove inconclusive, the state has still incurred no cost.  
If the results of the test could provide material evidence of factual 
innocence, the government’s interest in the finality of judgments is no 
longer at issue, because the government cannot have a finality interest in 
imprisoning an innocent person.136  In addition, the interests of the victim in 
this case, McKithen’s estranged wife, would arguably have to cede to 
McKithen’s interest in pursuing release, exculpatory evidence in hand.137 
¶37 However, as previously noted, even if McKithen were to receive a 
favorable result from the DNA evidence, it would lack the power to shine 
real doubt upon his conviction.  Any potential result obtained through DNA 
analysis is consistent with the prosecution’s theory of the case at trial.  
Therefore, the state’s interest in the finality of judgments and the interests 
of the victim arguably weigh against reopening a case in which there is no 
possibility of calling the verdict into question. 
4. Weighing the Mathews factors 
¶38   In McKithen’s case, the Mathews factors call for a finding that 
McKithen’s due process rights have not been violated by the procedure he 
was afforded.  Due to the factual nature of any DNA evidence in his case, 
he lacks the possibility of being exculpated.  Though the cost and burden to 
the state in affording access to the DNA evidence are arguably negligible, 
the lack of probative value of any evidence produced weighs against a grant 
of access. 
                                                     
136 See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110–11 (reaffirming that the 
government’s “overriding interest [is] that ‘justice shall be done’”); see also In 
re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[The] 
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137 See Wade v. Brady, 460 F. Supp. 2d 226, 249 (D. Mass. 2006) (“Victims 
may have an interest in moving on but they do not have an interest in 
imprisoning the wrong person.”). 
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III. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND POST-CONVICTION ACCESS TO 
DNA EVIDENCE 
¶39 A post-conviction right of access to DNA evidence does not fall 
within the realm of previously recognized substantive due process rights.138  
Substantive due process, though controversial, is firmly enshrined in 
constitutional jurisprudence.139  Rights protected through substantive due 
process are those which are “fundamental,” found in the history and 
traditions of England and America, and ''implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty.”140  The Supreme Court teaches that the “Due Process Clause 
“bar[s] certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the 
procedures used to implement them.”141  Post-conviction access to DNA 
evidence has never been explicitly held to constitute such a fundamental 
right.142  However, the view has been advanced that under established 
Supreme Court precedent there may be a substantive due process right to 
access evidence for the purposes of post-conviction DNA testing.143  The 
following arguments have been submitted for the proposition that a 
substantive due process right of post-conviction access to DNA evidence 
may exist. 
A. Right of access to evidence 
¶40 A substantive due process right to post-conviction DNA testing 
may fall within a substantive due process right of access to evidence.  Under 
this view, 
the right of access to evidence is sufficiently supported by the history 
and traditions that our criminal justice system be fair and that the 
innocent not be wrongfully deprived of their liberty, and by our now-
settled practice, adopted in pursuit of the same interests, that all 
potentially exculpatory evidence be provided to the accused in 
advance of trial (and even to the convicted post-trial, if previously 
known to the government).144
Such an argument contends that a right of access to evidence is rooted in 
Anglo-American jurisprudence.  However, DNA testing has fundamentally 
                                                     
138 Harvey II, 285 F.3d 298, 311 (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig, J., respecting the denial 
of rehearing en banc). 
139 McKithen, 481 F.3d at 107 n.17 (citing County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 
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changed the very nature of evidence and has opened up a new possibility for 
the production of conclusive, potentially exculpatory evidence after an 
individual has already been convicted.145  Therefore, this right of access to 
evidence should reflect the new realities of technology and encompass 
access to this new type of evidence.146
B. Right to be free from arbitrary governmental action 
¶41 Proponents of a substantive due process right to post-conviction 
DNA testing have advanced the notion that such a right could be grounded 
in an individual’s right to be free from arbitrary governmental action.147  It 
is a constitutional principle that the due process clause was “intended to 
secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of 
government.”148  The Supreme Court has defined arbitrary governmental 
action as including “the exercise of power without any reasonable 
justification in the service of a legitimate governmental objective.”149  
However, the Supreme Court has ruled that the abuse of power needs to rise 
to the level of that which “shocks the conscience” for a due process 
violation to be found – thus providing a doctrinal failsafe for emergency 
situations.150  In certain post conviction access to evidence cases, where the 
evidence withheld has the capability to conclusively exculpate a prisoner, 
the refusal to turn it over might arguably rise to this shocking level.  One 
could indeed claim that it is 
shockingly arbitrary that the government would literally dispose of the 
evidence used to deny one of his liberty (if not his right to life) before 
it would turn that evidence over to the individual, when he steadfastly 
maintains his factual innocence and ask only that he be allowed to 
subject that evidence to tests which, it is conceded, given the evidence 
                                                     
145 See Kreimer & Rudovsky, supra note 72, at 595.
146 Harvey II, 285 F.3d at 315 n.6 (Luttig, J., respecting the denial of rehearing 
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introduced at trial in support of conviction, could prove him absolutely 
innocent of the crime.151
But if the evidence sought would provide no conclusive information about 
the prisoner’s guilt or innocence, an argument that denial of access “shocks 
the conscience” appears substantially less convincing. 
C. Substantive due process in McKithen’s case 
¶42 Even if a right of access for post-conviction DNA testing can 
sometimes be found through the doctrine of substantive due process, this 
right does not exist in McKithen’s case.  As discussed above with respect to 
procedural due process, even a favorable result from the DNA testing would 
not conclusively exculpate McKithen, nor shine serious doubt on his 
conviction in light of the overwhelming evidence against him.  Having so 
concluded, the government in not acting arbitrarily in denying McKithen 
access to the DNA evidence.  It is in no way shocking to the conscience that 
the government could have concluded that there are no circumstances under 
which the evidence would be exculpatory and therefore the interests of 
finality and conservation of resources favor denial of access.  Furthermore, 
no right of access can be recognized when the evidence is not potentially 
exculpatory.  No general substantive due process right of access to all 
evidence in the state’s possession has ever been recognized.  Therefore, 
even if one accepts the arguments advanced for a limited substantive due 
process right to post-conviction access, the right does not exist in this 
factual circumstance. 
CONCLUSION 
¶43 The Second Circuit charged the district court with a weighty task 
when it asked the court to consider the existence and boundaries of a 
constitutional post-conviction right of access to DNA evidence grounded in 
due process jurisprudence.  The revolutionary technology of DNA testing, 
which has the potential to conclusively exculpate, may merit the recognition 
of an interest in accessing evidence for potentially exonerative DNA testing.  
However, where it is impossible that the evidence sought could ever prove 
exculpatory, the recognition of a right of access to evidence for DNA 
testing is not supported by current constitutional doctrine or reasonable 
extensions thereof.  There is no logical possibility that the potential DNA 
evidence sought by McKithen could exculpate him from his crime.  
Therefore, the district should conclude that even if it accepts the arguments 
proposing that a post-conviction right of access to evidence for DNA testing 
may sometimes exist, such a right does not exist under the circumstances of 
McKithen’s case. 
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POSTSCRIPT 
¶44 Since the time that the body of this iBrief was written, Brown 
petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was denied on 
February 19, 2008.152  In July of 2008, the district court for the Eastern 
District of New York decided McKithen v. Brown on remand.153  Judge 
Gleeson, in a thorough, forty-eight page opinion, held that prisoners do 
indeed retain a constitutionally-protected post-conviction liberty interest in 
meaningful access to existing executive mechanisms of clemency.154   He 
then determined that McKithen was entitled to access to the knife for the 
purposes of DNA testing as a matter of procedural due process.155  In dicta, 
he further announced that under some circumstances, a substantive due 
process right of access to evidence for DNA testing exists.156 
¶45 Judge Gleeson considered the arguments highlighted by this iBrief 
and ultimately found the argument advocating a residual liberty interest in 
meaningful access to clemency mechanisms to be persuasive.157  He framed 
the origin of the right in terms of a “prosecutor’s duty to seek justice,” 
noting that such a duty continues after a conviction becomes final.158  After 
conviction, that duty requires a prosecutor to “disclose only such evidence 
which, if the defendant had access to it but was erroneously prevented from 
using it, would deprive the defendant of either of his remaining rights 
relating to guilt or innocence”—one of those rights being that of access to 
the courts and the other, that of meaningful access to clemency 
proceedings.159 
¶46 Drawing an analogy to transcripts of habeas corpus proceedings, to 
which a prisoner’s access is constitutionally required, Judge Gleeson 
concluded that “the fact that evidence of innocence is neither sufficient nor 
strictly necessary for a favorable outcome does not indicate that it can never 
be required by the right of meaningful access to existing clemency 
mechanisms.”160  Instead, “like such a transcript, the evidence of innocence 
must be forceful enough to be practically necessary in a plea for clemency 
based on innocence.”161  Addressing the requisite reliability of such 
evidence he determined that “evidence of innocence that is of 
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unimpeachable reliability is practically necessary if it undermines 
confidence in the outcome of the trial.”162 
¶47 After conducting the appropriate Mathews balancing, Judge 
Gleeson held as follows: 
After balancing this interest against the government's interests in light 
of the risk of erroneous deprivation and the probable value of 
additional safeguards, I conclude that in states possessing some 
clemency mechanism (including a parole system) which can reduce or 
undo a prisoner's sentence based on the ground that the prisoner is 
actually innocent, and at least where, as here, the tests can be 
performed effectively without imposing non-negligible fiscal or other 
burdens on the government or subjecting an individual to 
nonconsensual DNA testing not otherwise authorized by law, a 
prisoner has a right to access physical evidence for the purpose of 
DNA testing if: the physical evidence is in the possession of the 
government; the testing is nonduplicative; and assuming exculpatory 
results, the results of the testing would undermine confidence in the 
outcome of trial.163
¶48 As the Second Circuit explicitly instructed the district court to 
consider a substantive due process foundation for a post-conviction right of 
access to DNA evidence, Judge Gleeson discussed the circumstances under 
which he would find that denial of access to physical evidence for DNA 
testing shocks the conscience and therefore constitutes arbitrary 
governmental action barred by the dictates of constitutional substantive due 
process.164  Judge Gleeson 
would conclude that if a prosecutor refuses a prisoner's specific 
request for access to physical evidence for DNA testing, in 
circumstances where the testing could be performed at negligible cost 
to the state and the results of the testing, if exculpatory, would prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the prisoner did not commit the crime 
for which she is incarcerated, the prosecutor exhibits deliberate 
indifference to the possibility that the prisoner is actually innocent.165  
This deliberate indifference in circumstances when the results could be 
conclusively exculpatory “shocks the conscience” and therefore, a prisoner 
has a substantive due process right to be free from such arbitrary 
governmental conduct.166  However, because the probative value of the 
evidence in McKithen’s case is so low, Judge Gleeson rightly did not find 
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that the governmental action in McKithen’s case to rose to this demanding 
standard. 
¶49 Judge Gleeson turned then to McKithen’s procedural due process 
claim.  Under his previous analysis, the potential DNA evidence would, if 
exculpatory, need to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial to 
require the government to release the knife to McKithen.167  He feels it is 
necessary to assume that the results would be exculpatory, which in this 
case, means assuming that DNA belonging to a criminal in a DNA database 
collected for law enforcement purposes is found on the knife.168  Even in 
the highly unlikely event that such DNA were found, McKithen would not 
be conclusively exculpated, as multiple eyewitness accounts as well as his 
own statements provided strong evidence against him.  Indeed Judge 
Gleeson correctly noted that even the presence of such DNA would not 
change the result of McKithen’s trial, given all the other evidence the 
government possessed against him.169  However, he did conclude that such 
a finding would undermine confidence in McKithen’s trial, and as a result, 
access to the DNA evidence was constitutionally required.170 
Judge Gleeson’s analysis correctly weights the importance of post-
conviction DNA testing and appropriately concludes that there are 
circumstances under which it is constitutionally required.  However, his 
formulation of the procedural due process right, which requires the 
assumption of exculpatory results and demands testing when the results 
would undermine confidence in the trial is too weak of a hurdle to 
overcome and invites frivolous demands for testing.  If one must assume 
that skin cells from a criminal in a law enforcement database are on any 
objects associated with a crime, no matter how unlikely that scenario is, 
virtually any request for access to any object in evidence will present a 
situation in which DNA testing must be ordered.  If the Constitution 
demands such testing, then prisoners should indeed receive it.  However, it 
is unclear whether the dictates of procedural due process truly extend that 
far, and courts should be wary of reading them in such an expansive 
manner. 
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